This article appears in the following Law, Probability and Risk issue: SPECIAL ISSUE Forensic Science For The 21st Century: The ASU Conference. Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA, April 2009 [
View the issue table of contents]
Forensic science reform in the 21st century: a major conference, a blockbuster report and reasons to be pessimistic
Jonathan J. Koehler
Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, IL 60611, USA
Email: jay.koehler@northwestern.edu
 | Abstract |
|---|
A 2009 conference at Arizona State University brought together
leading scholars to discuss the future of forensic science in
light of the blockbuster National Academy of Sciences report
entitled ‘Strengthening Forensic Science in the United
States: A Path Forward’. This paper introduces the special
issue on forensic science that this conference spawned, considers
the significance of the report and then offer reasons to be
pessimistic about whether major reforms are forthcoming.
Keywords: evidence; forensic science; individualization; National Academy of Sciences; National Research Council
[Reprint (PDF) Version of Koehler]
Abstract 2 of 5 
© The Author [2009]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
This article appears in the following Law, Probability and Risk issue: SPECIAL ISSUE Forensic Science For The 21st Century: The ASU Conference. Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA, April 2009 [
View the issue table of contents]
What ‘Strengthening Forensic Science’ today means for tomorrow: DNA exceptionalism and the 2009 NAS Report
Erin Murphy Assistant Professor, University of California Berkeley School of Law, Boalt Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
Email: eemurphy@law.berkeley.edu
Received on 23 August 2009. Revised on 18 October 2009.
| Abstract |
|---|
Congress explicitly ordered the National Academy of Science
to investigate ‘non-DNA’ forensic techniques. But
DNA typing nonetheless exerted great influence over every aspect
of the process, from the story of how the committee came into
existence to the final contents of the report's pages. This
article unearths the pivotal role played by DNA typing in the
formation and execution of the committee's mission. It then
uses that history to caution against ‘DNA exceptionalism’—the
inclination to view DNA as uniquely impermeable to error or
as requiring less oversight and scrutiny than traditional methods.
Instead,
this article argues that the committee's recommendations should be interpreted as safeguards essential for all forensic methods, not just the ones expressly covered by the report.
Keywords: NAS Report; DNA; forensic science; evidence
[Reprint (PDF) Version of Murphy]
Abstract 3 of 5 © The Author [2009]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
This article appears in the following Law, Probability and Risk issue: SPECIAL ISSUE Forensic Science For The 21st Century: The ASU Conference. Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA, April 2009 [
View the issue table of contents]
Who speaks for science? A response to the National Academy of Sciences Report on forensic science
Simon A. Cole Associate Professor of Criminology, Law & Society, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-7080, USA
Email: scole@uci.edu
Received on 15 May 2009. Revised on 15 September 2009. Accepted on 16 September 2009.
| Abstract |
|---|
This response focuses on the treatment of latent print identification
by the recent National Academy of Science (NAS) Report on forensic
science. It begins by situating the Report in the historical
context of a decade of controversy over the validity of latent
print identification.
Stark disagreement between the academic and judicial communities over this issue created a situation in which the question of which of these two communities would ‘speak for science’ became contested. The Report's
support of the academic position demonstrated the lack of support
among non-practitioners for the claims of extreme disc
rimination
and accuracy advanced on behalf of latent prints.
The Report in some sense constitutes the response of institutionalized science to this issue. Nonetheless, it is still unclear whether
the Report will function, as some may have hoped, as a ‘court
of last resort’ on this issue or whether the courts themselves
will again arbitrate it. The response then turns to the issue
of how latent print conclusions can be reported in the wake
of the NAS Report. The Report expresses clear disapproval of
the reporting framework currently mandated by latent print professional
organizations, creating a tension around the reporting of analyses.
The response concludes that semantic resolutions to this tension
are undesirable compared to resolutions based on empirical data.
Keywords: National Academy of Science; forensic science; fingerprint; expert witnesses; general acceptance
[Reprint (PDF) Version of Cole]
Abstract 4 of 5 © The Author [2010]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
This article appears in the following Law, Probability and Risk issue: SPECIAL ISSUE Forensic Science For The 21st Century: The ASU Conference. Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA, April 2009 [
View the issue table of contents]
The use of technology in human expert domains: challenges and risks arising from the use of automated fingerprint identification systems in forensic science
Itiel E. Dror Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London (UCL) and Cognitive Consultants International (CCI) Ltd, 17 Queen Square, London, WC1N 3AR, UK
Jennifer L. Mnookin
Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law, 405 Hilgard Ave, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA
Email: i.dror@ucl.ac.uk. More information is available at www.CognitiveConsultantsInternational.com
Email: mnookin@law.ucla.edu
Received on 14 May 2009. Revised on 19 October 2009. Accepted on 3 November 2009.
| Abstract |
|---|
Cognitive technologies have increased in sophistication and
use, to the point of interactively collaborating and distributing
cognition between technology and humans. The use of Automated
Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS), computerized databases
of fingerprints, by latent fingerprint experts, is a par-excellence
illustration of such a partnership in forensic investigations.
However, the deployment and use of cognitive technology is not
a simple matter.
If a technology is going to be used to its maximum potential, we must first understand the implications and consequences of using it and make whatever adaptations are necessary both to the technology and to the way humans work with it. As we demonstrate with AFIS, latent fingerprint identification
has been transformed by technology, but the strategies used
by humans who work with this technology have not adequately
been modified and adjusted in response to these transformations.
For example, the chances that an AFIS search will produce prints
with incidental similarities—i.e. that
highly similar, look-alike, prints from different sources will result from an AFIS search—has not been sufficiently investigated or
explored.
This risk, as well as others, may mean that the use of AFIS introduces new concerns into the process of latent fingerprint identification, some of which may even increase the chances of making erroneous identifications. Only by appropriate and
explicit adaptation to the new potential and the new challenges
posed by the new technology will AFIS and other cognitive technologies
produce efficient and effective partnerships.
Keywords: cognitive technology; bias; AFIS; database searches; fingerprint identification; forensic science; evidence experts; judgment and decision making
[Reprint (PDF) Version of Dror and Mnookin]
Abstract 5 of 5 © The Author [2010]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
This article appears in the following Law, Probability and Risk issue: SPECIAL ISSUE Forensic Science For The 21st Century: The ASU Conference. Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA, April 2009 [
View the issue table of contents]
Rational bias in forensic science
Glen Whitman Associate Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, California State University, Northridge, 18111 Nordhoff Street, Northridge, CA 91330-8374, USA
Roger Koppl
Professor of Economics and Finance, Department of Economics and Finance and Institute for Forensic Science Administration, Silberman School of Business, Fairleigh Dickinson University, Madison, NJ 07940, USA
Email: glen.whitman@gmail.com
Email: koppl@fdu.edu
Received on 26 May 2009. Revised on 1 October 2009.
| Abstract |
|---|
The current organization of forensic science induces biases in the conduct of forensic science even if forensic scientists are perfectly rational. Assuming forensic examiners are flawless Bayesian statisticians helps us to identify structural sources of error that we might otherwise have undervalued or missed altogether. Specifically, forensic examiners’ conclusions are affected not just by objective test results but also by two subjective factors: their prior beliefs about a suspect's likely guilt or innocence and the relative importance they attach to convicting the guilty rather than the innocent. The authorities—police and prosecutors—implicitly convey information to forensic examiners by their very decision to submit samples for testing. This information induces the examiners to update their prior beliefs in a manner that results in a greater tendency to provide testimony that incriminates the defendant. Forensic results are in a sense ‘contaminated’ by the prosecution and thus do not provide jurors with an independent source of information. Structural reforms to address such problems of rational bias include independence from law enforcement, blind proficiency testing and separation of test from interpretation.
Keywords: forensic science; bias; Bayesian; NAS report; organization
[Reprint (PDF) Version of Whitman and Koppl]
Online ISSN 1470-840X - Print ISSN 1470-8396
