Wednesday, September 29, 2010

Security vs Privacy & Human Rights

I blog for human rights  


Here is some thing I was writing in connection with dichotomy of security  vs privacy  in one of the  yahoo groups:


_________________________________________________________

We have moved on from looking at the issue from "security" angle to "privacy" angle.

"Privacy" is defined as one of the fundamental Human Rights of being variously called  "right to be left alone"!

It is also described as  the right of individual to be protected against intrusion into his personal life or affairs, or those of his family, by direct physical means or publication of information."
To understand "privacy", one needs to understand:

  • The legal systems, sources of Privacy Laws and key legal terms.
  • Key components of privacy and security laws.
  • Basic theories of  information privacy & security laws.
  • Theories of liability for privacy non-compliance.
 We generally tend to be not really sensitized to privacy at all. To be identified to Police or instruments of the State like Army every time we walk on the streets of the city/town or village is definitely an invasion on the privacy of the individual, be they be citizen or foreigner on legal visit or even illegal immigrant.  These are parts of Human  Rights as declared universal Human Rights declaration.

Consider the case of confiscation of  documents from the computers of Major General VK Singh and Brig Dasgupta  by Delhi Police. It was clearly a violation of privacy of highest nature. Yet, we take it very lightly. 

The legal protection of Privacy Rights has a far reaching history. In 1765, British Lord Camden struck down a warrant to enter and seize the papers from a home, and in so doing wrote, "we can safely say there is no law in this country to justify the defendants (the King) in what they have done; if there was, it would destroy all the comforts of of society, for papers are often the dearest property any man can have."

Did Englishmen actually ever have a unique right to act as they please within the walls of their own home? Well, yes and no. Yes, in the sense that it has been a legal precept in England, since at least the 17th century, that no one may enter a home, which would typically then have been in male ownership, unless by invitation. This was established as common law by the lawyer and politician Sir Edward Coke (pronounced Cook), in The Institutes of the Laws of England, 1628:
"For a man's house is his castle, et domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium [and each man's home is his safest refuge]."
What was meant by 'castle' was defined in 1763 by the British Prime Minister with an admirable selection of names to choose from - William Pitt, the first Earl of Chatham, also known as Pitt the Elder:
"The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the crown. It may be frail - its roof may shake - the wind may blow through it - the storm may enter - the rain may enter - but the King of England cannot enter; all his forces dare not crossed the threshold of the ruined tenement."


Here is a good article on  Security vs Privacy by a guru on the subject.

Schneier on Security vs Privacy

A blog covering security and security technology.

January 29, 2008

Security vs. Privacy

If there's a debate that sums up post-9/11 politics, it's security versus privacy. Which is more important? How much privacy are you willing to give up for security? Can we even afford privacy in this age of insecurity? Security versus privacy: It's the battle of the century, or at least its first decade.
In a Jan. 21 New Yorker article, Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell discusses a proposed plan to monitor all -- that's right, all -- internet communications for security purposes, an idea so extreme that the word "Orwellian" feels too mild.
The article (now online here) contains this passage:
In order for cyberspace to be policed, internet activity will have to be closely monitored. Ed Giorgio, who is working with McConnell on the plan, said that would mean giving the government the authority to examine the content of any e-mail, file transfer or Web search. "Google has records that could help in a cyber-investigation," he said. Giorgio warned me, "We have a saying in this business: 'Privacy and security are a zero-sum game.'"
I'm sure they have that saying in their business. And it's precisely why, when people in their business are in charge of government, it becomes a police state. If privacy and security really were a zero-sum game, we would have seen mass immigration into the former East Germany and modern-day China. While it's true that police states like those have less street crime, no one argues that their citizens are fundamentally more secure.
We've been told we have to trade off security and privacy so often -- in debates on security versus privacy, writing contests, polls, reasoned essays and political rhetoric -- that most of us don't even question the fundamental dichotomy.
But it's a false one.
Security and privacy are not opposite ends of a seesaw; you don't have to accept less of one to get more of the other. Think of a door lock, a burglar alarm and a tall fence. Think of guns, anti-counterfeiting measures on currency and that dumb liquid ban at airports. Security affects privacy only when it's based on identity, and there are limitations to that sort of approach.
Since 9/11, approximately three things have potentially improved airline security: reinforcing the cockpit doors, passengers realizing they have to fight back and -- possibly -- sky marshals. Everything else -- all the security measures that affect privacy -- is just security theater and a waste of effort.
By the same token, many of the anti-privacy "security" measures we're seeing -- national ID cards, warrantless eavesdropping, massive data mining and so on -- do little to improve, and in some cases harm, security. And government claims of their success are either wrong, or against fake threats.
The debate isn't security versus privacy. It's liberty versus control.
You can see it in comments by government officials: "Privacy no longer can mean anonymity," says Donald Kerr, principal deputy director of national intelligence. "Instead, it should mean that government and businesses properly safeguard people's private communications and financial information." Did you catch that? You're expected to give up control of your privacy to others, who -- presumably -- get to decide how much of it you deserve. That's what loss of liberty looks like.
It should be no surprise that people choose security over privacy: 51 to 29 percent in a recent poll. Even if you don't subscribe to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, it's obvious that security is more important. Security is vital to survival, not just of people but of every living thing. Privacy is unique to humans, but it's a social need. It's vital to personal dignity, to family life, to society -- to what makes us uniquely human -- but not to survival.
If you set up the false dichotomy, of course people will choose security over privacy -- especially if you scare them first. But it's still a false dichotomy. There is no security without privacy. And liberty requires both security and privacy. The famous quote attributed to Benjamin Franklin reads: "Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety." It's also true that those who would give up privacy for security are likely to end up with neither.
This essay originally appeared on Wired.com.
Posted on January 29, 2008 at 5:21 AM93 Comments

____________________________________________________________


According to Privacy International,
"Privacy is a fundamental human right. It underpins human dignity and other values such as freedom of association and freedom of speech. It has become one of the most important human rights of the modern age.
Privacy is recognized around the world in diverse regions and cultures. It is protected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and in many other international and regional human rights treaties. Nearly every country in the world includes a right of privacy in its constitution. At a minimum, these provisions include rights of inviolability of the home and secrecy of communications. Most recently written constitutions include specific rights to access and control one's personal information. In many of the countries where privacy is not explicitly recognized in the constitution, the courts have found that right in other provisions. In many countries, international agreements that recognize privacy rights such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the European Convention on Human Rights have been adopted into law."
The organization also points out that "The recognition of privacy is deeply rooted in history. There is recognition of privacy in the Qur'an and in the sayings of Mohammed. The Bible has numerous references to privacy. Jewish law has long recognized the concept of being free from being watched. There were also protections in classical Greece and ancient China.
Although privacy is seen as a fundamental and universal right, it's not easily to define. For one thing, it does depend to some degree on culture and context. New communication technology as well as new surveillance technology has shown also that privacy — and the threats to it — also change over time. Generally speaking, "privacy protection is frequently seen as a way of drawing the line at how far society can intrude into a person's affairs" (Privacy International, ____). United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis explained privacy simply as the individual's "right to be left alone."

 Also see:

The Right to Be Left Alone


Privacy and Human Rights 2003: Overview

 

Monday, August 23, 2010

Brig Dasgupta in jail for 4 yrs without trial gets bail

I blog for human rights  



 Tuesday, August 24, 2010 Bullet New Delhi Bullet Today's Issue (The Pioneer)

Staff Reporter | New Delhi

Brigadier (Retd) Ujjal Dasgupta, who was arrested four years ago on the charge of passing on classified information to an American diplomat, was finally granted bail by a city court on Monday. The ailing Dasgupta had been incarcerated all these years with no chargesheet filed against him.

His family members and former colleagues had been struggling for months for his release after Dasgupta’s health deteriorated inside Tihar Jail. The Pioneer, in a series of reports, had highlighted the Brigadier’s plight, following which he was admitted to AIIMS in May 2010 for a complete medical investigation.

Additional Sessions Judge Inder Jeet Singh granted the bail subject to his furnishing a personal bond of `75,000 and a surety of the same amount, with the conditions that he will not leave the country or contact any of the case witnesses.

Dasgupta, now 64, had been seeking bail on health grounds. He had suffered a massive heat attack in November 1988 and undergone a coronary artery bypass graft surgery at AIIMS. Dasgupta is the last of the three accused to get bail in the case. Commodore (Retd) Mukesh Saini, who was working with the National Security Council Secretariat, and Shib Shankar Paul, a senior systems analyst at the Secretariat, have already been granted bail by the Tis Hazari court.

The soldier was put behind bars for four years, though evidence against him could not be gathered. His friends and relatives had been pointing out that denying him medical help amounted to denial of justice. In the wake of investigative agencies’ failure to gather evidence, his former colleagues had begun a campaign seeking justice for Dasgupta. “This is good news and we are very happy. I am sure his glory will be restored since he has always been an intelligent person and an officer,” said one of his former colleagues.

Dasgupta, director of computer cell at the Research and Analysis Wing, was arrested on July 19, 2006, under provisions of the Official Secrets Act and accused of giving sensitive information to Rossanna Minchew, an American diplomat. The prosecution claimed that he had passed on the information through pen drives, which were recovered during investigation. His office laptop, home computer and some hard disks had also been seized by the prosecution.

“The house of the applicant was searched and raided in violation of the statutory provisions of law envisaged in the Official Secrets Act and Sub-Inspector Sajjan Singh was not authorised to conduct the investigation in the case,” Dasgupta’s counsel Pramod Kumar Dubey argued.

“There is collusion between the police/special cell, R&AW and IB officials to implicate the applicant (Dasgupta) falsely,” he added.

Dubey also argued that Dasgupta, a 63 year old heart patient, has clean antecedents and has undergone triple bypass surgery. The documents contained in two envelopes, supplied by the prosecution, do not contain classified information, he said. Dasgupta was detained on the basis of these documents which the prosecution had claimed were classified. The documents were supplied to Dasgupta only after an intervention by the court.

Dasgupta was looking after the development of ‘Anveshak’, a database management system. The court, in its “prima facie” observation, said Central Forensic Sciences Laboratory analysis of seized hard disk showed that computer files related to Anveshak were last accessed in May 2005. Minchew was given visa for India in August, 2005 and therefore could not have received any information on Anveshak from Dasgupta as the file had last been accessed in May 2005. Minchew was in India to coordinate Indo-US Cyber Security Forum. Dasgupta also pointed out that as per the prosecution itself, the Anveshak software is not classified.


Original Story: http://www.dailypioneer.com/278281/Brig-in-jail-for-4-yrs-without-trial-gets-bail.html 

Sunday, August 22, 2010

Two security hands find themselves chained to bizarre charges

I blog for human rights  

 The following excerpts of an article raises some pertinent questions: Why are they in jail if the charges are unprovable for more than 5 years?Is it not a Human Rights violation? Why is Government of India silent when Delhi Police has committed a gross error and impropriety? And the terrible cost is being paid by the two veterans who had devoted their life in the service of the nation and had pledged their life for the cause every day of their life in service of the nation!
What will be the case if these two honorably discharged veterans  were related to the powerful families of India? Why are the India's veteran community so silent? Because we, the veterans community lack the  power of critical thinking and courage of conviction to take a stand for our fellow veterans! Are you listening, the so called veteran community leaders and organizations? Is your conscience made of rotten dead wood?

Wake up, the veteran community of India.

Security
The Web Of Kafka
Two security hands find themselves chained to bizarre charges!
Saikat Datta
While the intelligence and police apparatus spares the likes of Ravind Sistala and Arun Dixit—NTRO officials of joint secretary level who mysteriously lost their laptops containing top secret information about India’s missile monitoring system and N-weapons programme—it has been quick to victimise innocents. The authorities failed to affix blame for laxity even when 53 computers full of secret codes were stolen from DRDO’s labs at Metcalfe House, Delhi. The computer shells were found subsequently, but their hard disks remain untraced. But in 2006, an overenthusiastic Delhi police went all out against Commander Mukesh Saini, a retired naval officer, after he was accused of leaking secrets to a foreign agent. Saini, who has a masters in computer management and business administration, had served the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) for almost three years as its top cyber security expert.
In 2006, Saini was granted premature retirement to seek a career in the private sector. Armed with his expertise, Saini landed a job with software major Microsoft. He was all set to begin a new career when his world fell apart. The Delhi police arrested him for allegedly leaking secrets to an American agent. Also arrested was Brig Ujjal Dasgupta, the computer security expert of RAW, India’s external intelligence agency. Both arrests were made under the draconian Official Secrets Act. According to the grapevine, in its overenthusiasm, the IB had got the wrong men and once it set the police on them, it didn’t want to admit its mistake.
Saini finally got out of jail on bail after nearly four years. Today he is an angry and bitter man, who has already spent more time in jail than what even his maximum sentence would have entailed—which is three years—and that too even before the trial began. His story, and that of Dasgupta, are in stark contrast to the security breaches committed by NTRO’s Sistala and Dixit. And yet, without any powerful lobby to help them, Saini and Dasgupta became victims of a case that was questionable from the very start.


Forensic analysis has shown this RAW hand had not accessed what he’s accused of leaking in years. He languishes in jail, awaiting trial.Brig Ujjal Dasgupta (Retd), Computer security expert

Sample this. Saini, who was serving with the NSCS, should have been arrested and prosecuted after the competent authority gave sanction, as mandated by the Official Secrets Act. The authority in this case was clearly the NSCS. But when the police went to it for sanction, they were turned down. Embarrassed, the cops approached the defence ministry, which, incidentally, had nothing to do with the case to begin with. But the defence ministry’s deputy secretary, V.P. Varghese, didn’t even seek, let alone examine the documents cited as evidence by the police. Sources say Varghese was given a draft sanction order which he immediately signed without applying his mind or even referring it to his seniors. This brings us to the documents allegedly “leaked” by Saini and cited as “evidence” against him. They were the “draft report of the Indian nuclear doctrine” and a note on the “KRA Canal (Thailand) and its impact on India”. But both documents were unclassified. In fact, one of them, the nuclear doctrine document, had been released to the media years ago, according to the NSCS. The other document, a note on the proposed KRA canal in Thailand, was written by Saini himself. It examined the dangers posed by such a canal, as it would link the Andaman Sea to the South China Sea, giving China access to the Andaman & Nicobar Islands. The NSCS has clearly stated that this is not its document, and therefore couldn’t be  one that was classified. All that Saini had done was some loud thinking, set down on paper, about a canal project that eventually was cancelled by Thailand. If this was laughable, the evidence cited against Saini was even more ludicrous.

The police alleged that Saini had leaked the minutes of a meeting of the Indo-US Cyber Security Forum to an American agent, a  US embassy official, Rossanna Minchew. While Saini was the Indian coordinator for the forum, Minchew was his counterpart from the US. While submitting this document as “evidence”, the police failed to explain how a document that recorded the minutes of a meeting that was held with the Americans could be considered classified?
“Even if I did give the document to Minchew, as alleged,” says Saini, “then I am only giving her what she or her colleagues who attended the meeting already knew!” But the police nevertheless cited this as “evidence”. To take the cake, there was a far more serious flaw in the allegation: the police claimed the document was the minutes of a meeting held on January 28, 2003. “However, no such meeting ever took place at all,” says Saini. “And the records of all the meetings of the forum are readily available.” Also cited as ‘evidence’ was a proposal by Saini for a network of computers that would enable all the intelligence agencies to share real-time data seamlessly. It remained on paper and was a harmless document showing how such a project could be implemented. Any networking engineer could draw up such a document.


Both the documents this officer is alleged to have leaked were not classified. In fact, one had been released to the media long ago.Commander Mukesh Saini (Retd), Ex-NSCS cyber security expert

And for Dasgupta? The police cited numerous calls between Dasgupta and Minchew as “evidence”. But both were after all part of a forum set up by the Indian and US governments, and therefore bound to interact. The police also alleged that Dasgupta had leaked a secret RAW software, which he had developed, to the US. But how could a mere internal operating software be a secret? Files created using that system could have been secret. The operating system itself wouldn’t amount to a secret, so there’s no question of leakage. The more insidious parts of the prosecution lay elsewhere. The computers of Saini and Dasgupta had been confiscated on their arrest and sent to the Central Forensic Science Laboratory for analysis. Its report was devastating to the police case: the documents cited as ‘evidence’ hadn’t been accessed by Saini or Dasgupta for long. If that was true, how were they transmitted to Minchew? The strangest aspect of the case was government’s attitude towards Minchew, a co-accused in the case. Documents now available clearly show that the Indian embassy in Washington had done a thorough background check on her before granting her a visa. Ironically, while she was in Delhi even while the investigations were on, no effort was made to either arrest her or declare her persona non grata. Instead, she quietly flew out of Delhi and no one knows where she is. Even though India and the US are signatories to the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, no effort has been made by New Delhi to seek the questioning or deposition by Minchew.
Unlike the security breaches committed by the NTRO and DRDO officials, which have the potential to lay bare India’s most sensitive secrets, including its efforts at developing a capability to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike, Saini and Dasgupta’s alleged leaks were inconsequential. They were probably not even leaks. But for a security establishment in the habit of responding to the whims of the powerful, Saini and Dasgupta’s lives were expendable. Today Saini, though out on bail, is struggling to make ends meet, having sold off his house to pay legal fees. He has to go to court as and when summoned. Dasgupta languishes in jail awaiting trial.
Full Story: http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?266788

Sunday, July 4, 2010

What about the Official Secrets Act?

 The following excerpts of an article raises some pertinent questions on the Official Secrets Act!


Compromising India
Claude Arpi
August 3, 2007.
This month India will celebrate the 60th anniversary of its independence. A large number of new books, their authors pretending to rewrite the event, are being published – some have already hit bookstores. Though they have not created the hysteria unleashed over Harry Potter’s last adventure, they have generated a lot of ink in the media.
One of these books brings out the glamorous side of the most tragic event of the 20th century: The division of the sub-continent. In her memoirs entitled India Remembered: A Personal Account of the Mountbattens During the Transfer of Power, Pamela Mountbatten, the daughter of India’s last Viceroy, writes about her mother Edwina’s “deep emotional love” for India’s first Prime Minister. It could be dismissed as another schmaltzy tale written to reap some money, but the book contains serious assertions. She admits that Lord Mountbatten did use Edwina to influence Jawaharlal Nehru on Jammu & Kashmir.
The day I was reading this story (which seems to shock nobody in India), I came across an article in Outlook in which Maj Gen VK Singh, author of India’s External Intelligence: Secrets of Research and Analysis Wing had argued against the Kargil tapes being made public. The officer wanted to prove the relation between the tapes and the Official Secrets Act by taking the case of Brig Ujjal Dasgupta, Director, Computers, RAW who was arrested in July 2006. This officer was accused of having passed sensitive information to Rosanna Minchew, a CIA agent in the US Embassy. VK Singh argued, “Charges against Dasgupta have been framed under Official Secrets Act. As per the Act, if an Indian has any sort of communication with a foreign national, he’s presumed to have passed on information useful to an enemy.”
Though Maj Gen Singh’s comparing the release of Kargil tapes and Brig Dasgupta’s case is flimsy, one could ask: Can the special relations between Nehru and Edwina be seen from this angle? Nobody can deny today that the reference of Jammu & Kashmir to the UN has resulted in three wars for India and a lot of hardship for the people of that State.

......

By then Mountbatten was riding high. He spent Christmas day writing a long missive to Nehru, highlighting the danger of a military escalation and plied Attlee with confidential information. It is during those days probably that Edwina managed to make it “appealing to his heart more than his mind”. The events that followed are too well known. India’s case was buried in the bureaucratic corridors of the UN; the raiders were allowed to remain on Indian soil.
What about the Official Secrets Act?

 For original full Story go to:
http://www.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/070803CompromisingIndia.pdf
For comments on story go to:
http://www.sandeepweb.com/2007/08/03/nehrus-love-for-edwina-is-indias-continuing-nightmare/

Brig UD cant get Info under RTI till charges are framed!

Accused can't get RTI info till charges are framed: Delhi high court

Kanu Sharda / DNA
Saturday, July 3, 2010 0:57 IST
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New Delhi: An accused has no right to seek information under the right to information (RTI) Act till charges against him/her have been framed by a court, the Delhi high court has said.
The court’s observation came on a plea by a retired director of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) seeking direction to various agencies to disclose information under RTI.
The court of justice S Muralidhar dismissed the plea of Brigadier (retd) Ujjal Dasgupta, who had been arrested for leaking sensitive information to an agent of the CIA, America’s spy agency.
Dasgupta had filed a petition against the Centre for not disclosing information about software ‘Anveshak’, that was crucial to his defence in the espionage case against him.
Dasgupta was arrested in 2006 for violating the official secrets Act by passing on sensitive information to an American diplomat Rosanna Minchew.
The court dismissed his contention that not giving him the information amounted to violation of rights.
“The matter being before the trial court, the RTI Act cannot be used to circumvent the processes of law already in operation,” the court said.
Under the RTI Act, Dasgupta had wanted to know how ‘Anveshak’ was transferred to RAW, which agency installed it there and other details. But his plea was turned down by the government.

Tuesday, June 8, 2010

Brig U Dasgupta RTI Case

Here is the annotated pdf document bringing out the case in more detail while  examining the rights of Brig UD under RTI.

Download (218K)

RAW claims that if they use a DBMS package, then the DBMS package becomes classified !( By extension:  If they use Microsoft word, then Microsoft Word becomes classified and security and integrity of the nation s at stake !) See the jpg here: Download (115 KB)

The lack of solid case is  evident from the document which reveals a lot of the case.




NB: I have obtained the document from public sources

Monday, May 31, 2010

NSCS spying case: RTI reply shows cracks in police theory

NSCS spying case: RTI reply shows cracks in police theory
Daily News & Analysis
The sensational case came to light in June 2006 where Delhi police claimed that it has arrested three persons -- RAW official Brigadier Ujjal Dasgupta, ...



Analyze the case against the officers from the Criminal requirement ( highlighted in red) of Mens Rea and Causal relationship:

Mens Rea
A. Overview
There must be a mental element to a crime
Justifiable reasons are not used when considering mens rea
No valid criminal conviction can be obtained without proving the mental element for each charge
B. General Requirements of Culpability (italics = mine)
(1) Minimum requirements of Culpability - except as provided in Section 2.05, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposefully ,knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense
(2) Kinds of culpability defined
(a) Purposefully - Conscious objective to achieve a harmful result; similar to intentional
Result crimes: Murder, Theft, Battery (defendant must intent the result)
Conduct crimes: DWI, perjury (defendant is engaging in conduct that is likely to have a bad result)
Attendant circumstance crimes: burglary, bigamy, statutory rape (some condition must be present in addition to the conduct / result)

(b) Knowingly - Actor is aware the result will occur; aware his conduct is of this nature and the result is practically certain
(c) Recklessly - Consciously creates or disregards a substantial and unjust risk; involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct of a reasonable law abiding person
(d) Negligently - Inadvertent creation of the risk; failure to recognize a substantial and unjustifiable risk
(3) recklessly is the lowest element required when none are prescribed in the statute
(4) apply mens rea to all elements unless otherwise divided
(5) higher levels of culpability can substitute for lower levels
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense

Causal Relationships

(1) Conduct is the cause of a result when:
(a) it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred; and
(b) the relationship between the conduct and result satisfies any additional causal requirements imposed by the code or by the law defining the offense
(2) When purposely or knowingly causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not within the purpose or the contemplation of the actor unless:
(a) the actual result differs from that designed or contemplated, as the case may be only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the injury or harm designed or contemplated would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or
(b) the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense
(3) " " substitute "risk" for "purpose or contemplation"
(4) When causing a particular result is a material element of an offense for which absolute liability is imposed by law, the element is not established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the actor's conduct





The interpretation  of some official in NSCS does or does  not  make a crime from the Mens Rea and also Causal Relationships perspective.

The whole case falls on its own face!
How tenuous the case is and the officers spent 5 years in Tihar jail on the words of some character in NSCS! That official can not classify the document retrospectively on the basis of his "opinion". What a tragedy.

The minutes of the meeting is very well known to the "foreign agent" to whom the officers were accused of passing the information because she also attended the very same meeting!

How ridiculous the charge could get!

Nath


Monday, May 3, 2010

Foensic Science:a major conference, a blockbuster report and reasons to be pessimistic

 
This article appears in the following Law, Probability and Risk issue: SPECIAL ISSUE Forensic Science For The 21st Century: The ASU Conference. Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA, April 2009 [View the issue table of contents]

Forensic science reform in the 21st century: a major conference, a blockbuster report and reasons to be pessimistic

Jonathan J. Koehler{dagger} Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, IL 60611, USA
{dagger} Email: jay.koehler@northwestern.edu

   Abstract
A 2009 conference at Arizona State University brought together leading scholars to discuss the future of forensic science in light of the blockbuster National Academy of Sciences report entitled ‘Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward’. This paper introduces the special issue on forensic science that this conference spawned, considers the significance of the report and then offer reasons to be pessimistic about whether major reforms are forthcoming.

Keywords: evidence; forensic science; individualization; National Academy of Sciences; National Research Council

[Reprint (PDF) Version of Koehler]


Abstract 2 of 5 back © The Author [2009]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
This article appears in the following Law, Probability and Risk issue: SPECIAL ISSUE Forensic Science For The 21st Century: The ASU Conference. Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA, April 2009 [View the issue table of contents]

What ‘Strengthening Forensic Science’ today means for tomorrow: DNA exceptionalism and the 2009 NAS Report

Erin Murphy{dagger} Assistant Professor, University of California Berkeley School of Law, Boalt Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
{dagger} Email: eemurphy@law.berkeley.edu
Received on 23 August 2009. Revised on 18 October 2009.
   Abstract
Congress explicitly ordered the National Academy of Science to investigate ‘non-DNA’ forensic techniques. But DNA typing nonetheless exerted great influence over every aspect of the process, from the story of how the committee came into existence to the final contents of the report's pages. This article unearths the pivotal role played by DNA typing in the formation and execution of the committee's mission. It then uses that history to caution against ‘DNA exceptionalism’—the inclination to view DNA as uniquely impermeable to error or as requiring less oversight and scrutiny than traditional methods. Instead, this article argues that the committee's recommendations should be interpreted as safeguards essential for all forensic methods, not just the ones expressly covered by the report.

Keywords: NAS Report; DNA; forensic science; evidence

[Reprint (PDF) Version of Murphy]


Abstract 3 of 5 back © The Author [2009]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
This article appears in the following Law, Probability and Risk issue: SPECIAL ISSUE Forensic Science For The 21st Century: The ASU Conference. Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA, April 2009 [View the issue table of contents]

Who speaks for science? A response to the National Academy of Sciences Report on forensic science

Simon A. Cole{dagger} Associate Professor of Criminology, Law & Society, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-7080, USA
{dagger} Email: scole@uci.edu
Received on 15 May 2009. Revised on 15 September 2009. Accepted on 16 September 2009.

   Abstract
This response focuses on the treatment of latent print identification by the recent National Academy of Science (NAS) Report on forensic science. It begins by situating the Report in the historical context of a decade of controversy over the validity of latent print identification. Stark disagreement between the academic and judicial communities over this issue created a situation in which the question of which of these two communities would ‘speak for science’ became contested. The Report's support of the academic position demonstrated the lack of support among non-practitioners for the claims of extreme discrimination and accuracy advanced on behalf of latent prints. The Report in some sense constitutes the response of institutionalized science to this issue. Nonetheless, it is still unclear whether the Report will function, as some may have hoped, as a ‘court of last resort’ on this issue or whether the courts themselves will again arbitrate it. The response then turns to the issue of how latent print conclusions can be reported in the wake of the NAS Report. The Report expresses clear disapproval of the reporting framework currently mandated by latent print professional organizations, creating a tension around the reporting of analyses. The response concludes that semantic resolutions to this tension are undesirable compared to resolutions based on empirical data.

Keywords: National Academy of Science; forensic science; fingerprint; expert witnesses; general acceptance

[Reprint (PDF) Version of Cole]


Abstract 4 of 5 back © The Author [2010]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
This article appears in the following Law, Probability and Risk issue: SPECIAL ISSUE Forensic Science For The 21st Century: The ASU Conference. Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA, April 2009 [View the issue table of contents]

The use of technology in human expert domains: challenges and risks arising from the use of automated fingerprint identification systems in forensic science

Itiel E. Dror{dagger} Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London (UCL) and Cognitive Consultants International (CCI) Ltd, 17 Queen Square, London, WC1N 3AR, UK
Jennifer L. Mnookin{ddagger}
Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law, 405 Hilgard Ave, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA
{dagger} Email: i.dror@ucl.ac.uk. More information is available at www.CognitiveConsultantsInternational.com
{ddagger} Email: mnookin@law.ucla.edu
Received on 14 May 2009. Revised on 19 October 2009. Accepted on 3 November 2009.

   Abstract
Cognitive technologies have increased in sophistication and use, to the point of interactively collaborating and distributing cognition between technology and humans. The use of Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS), computerized databases of fingerprints, by latent fingerprint experts, is a par-excellence illustration of such a partnership in forensic investigations. However, the deployment and use of cognitive technology is not a simple matter. If a technology is going to be used to its maximum potential, we must first understand the implications and consequences of using it and make whatever adaptations are necessary both to the technology and to the way humans work with it. As we demonstrate with AFIS, latent fingerprint identification has been transformed by technology, but the strategies used by humans who work with this technology have not adequately been modified and adjusted in response to these transformations. For example, the chances that an AFIS search will produce prints with incidental similarities—i.e. that highly similar, look-alike, prints from different sources will result from an AFIS search—has not been sufficiently investigated or explored. This risk, as well as others, may mean that the use of AFIS introduces new concerns into the process of latent fingerprint identification, some of which may even increase the chances of making erroneous identifications. Only by appropriate and explicit adaptation to the new potential and the new challenges posed by the new technology will AFIS and other cognitive technologies produce efficient and effective partnerships.

Keywords: cognitive technology; bias; AFIS; database searches; fingerprint identification; forensic science; evidence experts; judgment and decision making

[Reprint (PDF) Version of Dror and Mnookin]


Abstract 5 of 5 back © The Author [2010]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
This article appears in the following Law, Probability and Risk issue: SPECIAL ISSUE Forensic Science For The 21st Century: The ASU Conference. Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA, April 2009 [View the issue table of contents]

Rational bias in forensic science

Glen Whitman{dagger} Associate Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, California State University, Northridge, 18111 Nordhoff Street, Northridge, CA 91330-8374, USA
Roger Koppl{ddagger}
Professor of Economics and Finance, Department of Economics and Finance and Institute for Forensic Science Administration, Silberman School of Business, Fairleigh Dickinson University, Madison, NJ 07940, USA
{dagger} Email: glen.whitman@gmail.com
{ddagger} Email: koppl@fdu.edu
Received on 26 May 2009. Revised on 1 October 2009.
   Abstract
The current organization of forensic science induces biases in the conduct of forensic science even if forensic scientists are perfectly rational. Assuming forensic examiners are flawless Bayesian statisticians helps us to identify structural sources of error that we might otherwise have undervalued or missed altogether. Specifically, forensic examiners’ conclusions are affected not just by objective test results but also by two subjective factors: their prior beliefs about a suspect's likely guilt or innocence and the relative importance they attach to convicting the guilty rather than the innocent. The authorities—police and prosecutors—implicitly convey information to forensic examiners by their very decision to submit samples for testing. This information induces the examiners to update their prior beliefs in a manner that results in a greater tendency to provide testimony that incriminates the defendant. Forensic results are in a sense ‘contaminated’ by the prosecution and thus do not provide jurors with an independent source of information. Structural reforms to address such problems of rational bias include independence from law enforcement, blind proficiency testing and separation of test from interpretation.

Keywords: forensic science; bias; Bayesian; NAS report; organization

[Reprint (PDF) Version of Whitman and Koppl]
Online ISSN 1470-840X - Print ISSN 1470-8396

Saturday, May 1, 2010

Anachronism of OSA 1923 and myopic delusion of law makers/enforcers of India

I had shared this earlier with some.

Planning on an adventure hike in your area of interest and wished you had the military maps of your area ?

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ams/india/nc-43-07a.jpg
This is 1:25000 map of my home area Palghat


You can get the map of your area of interest  here:
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ams/india/



=========================================================

India Maps



The following maps were produced by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, unless otherwise indicated.
Country Maps Detailed Maps Historical Maps
  • Bhuj-Anjar Area, Gujarat (Topographic Map) original scale 1:250,000. Portion of Sheet NF 42-3, Series U502, U.S. Army Map Service 1959 (618K)
  • Bombay 1909 from The Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island. Volume 1. Bombay, India 1909 (386K)
  • Bombay 1954 (City Plan) original scale 1:50,000 U.S. Army Map Service 1954 (233K)
  • Bombay - North 1954 (Topographic Map) original scale 1:250,000. Portion of Kalyan, Sheet NE 43-1, Series U502, U.S. Army Map Service compiled in 1954 and printed in 1963 (548K)
  • Bombay - South 1954 (Topographic Map) original scale 1:250,000. Portion of Bombay, Sheet NE 43-5, Series U502, U.S. Army Map Service, compiled in 1954, no publication date given (314K)
  • Calcutta 1945 (City Plan) from The Calcutta Key: Welcome United States Army. United States Army Forces in India-Burma, Information and Education Branch. Calcutta, 1945 (356K)
  • Damao [Daman] 1954 (Topographic Map) original scale 1:250,000. Portion of Navsari, Sheet NF 43-13, Series U502, U.S. Army Map Service compiled in 1954 and printed in 1956 (549K)
  • Delhi and Vicinity 1962 (City Plan) original scale 1:50,000 U.S. Army Map Service 1962 (264K)
  • India 1700-1792 from The Historical Atlas by William R. Shepherd, 1923 (645K)
  • India 1760 from The Public Schools Historical Atlas edited by C. Colbeck. Longmans, Green, and Co. 1905 (222K)
  • India 1882 from A Dictionary Practical, Theoretical, and Historical of Commerce and Commercial Navigation by J.R. M'Culloch. Longmans, Green and Co. London, 1882 (555K)
  • India and Pakistan Topographic Maps, Series U502, 1:250,000, U.S. Army Map Service, 1955-
  • Jaisalmer, Rajasthan (Topographic Map) original scale 1:250,000. Portion of Sheet NG 42-8, Series U502, U.S. Army Map Service 1959 (464K)
  • Kerala State (Topographic Map) original scale 1:1,000,000. Portion of Coimbatore sheet. NC 43, Series 1301. U.S. Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers, 1965 (464K)
Thematic Maps
Maps on Other Web Sites _________________________________________________________________________________

If you are tech savvy, you can install a Google earth  software in your nexus one phone


Warning: Don't go any where near any intelligence or Defense  establishment lest some over  enthusiastic sleuth should book you under  OSA 1923 crime!
Punishment:
  1. Defense establishment: 14 years
  2. Intelligence est: 3 years

British lawmakers of 1923 did not know that you can get all this from  from public domain !

Indian lawmakers and law enforcers  of 2010 are still under myopic delusion!
Anachronism of OSA 1923 is self delusional.

The Intelligence and Security Committee is a committee of parliamentarians appointed by the Prime Minister of UK to oversee the work of the Intelligence machinery of the United Kingdom. It was established by the Intelligence Services Act 1994.[1] It is unique inasmuch as it is not a committee of Parliament, but consists of nine parliamentarians appointed by, and reporting directly to, the Prime Minister. In this capacity it has greater powers than a select committee of Parliament, being able to demand papers from former governments and official advice to ministers, both of which are forbidden to select committees.


In India, the local police SHO (thanedar) oversee application of OSA 1923 on the citizens of India!


One consolation is: In Pakistan and Bangladesh, things are no different

See for yourself:
  1. India: 
    1. http://www.helplinelaw.com/docs/THE%20OFFICIAL%20SECRETS%20ACT,%201923
  2. Pakistan
    1. http://www.intermedia.org.pk/mrc/medialawdocs/OfficialSecretAct.pdf
  3. Bangladesh:
    1. http://www.drishtipat.org/HRLaw/secrets.htm
    2. http://bdlaws.gov.bd/pdf_part.php?id=132
Why Official Secrets Act needs a review: B Raman October 01, 2007


Our laws are  lagging technology and society as that of Pakistan & Bangladesh!
Pakistan & Bangladesh has the excuse that their technology and society is also lagging far behind.
Do we have that excuse?

Breaking a steganography software: Camouflage

I blog for human rights  
 

Caveat: Most of the home grown steganography software written by amateurs (including MCTE, Mhow) are easily breakable! (Thank GOD, Army did NOT say that the MCTE software is Classified! Had they said that, you can only call them stupid and nieve!) Any thing that is NOT open source and  NOT reviewed by Cryptographic community is total hog wash and  what is called "snake oil" in America.

For more on "snake oil" cryptography: read here:

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9902.html#snakeoil

http://www.interhack.net/people/cmcurtin/snake-oil-faq.html

 

Breaking a (very weak) steganography software: Camouflage

1. Background


Steganography is the technique for hiding data inside other data, for example, to hide a secret message inside a picture, or a secret picture inside a music file. There are several techniques to do that, and several softwares available. Some use complex algorithms and are pretty good at doing their job (it's difficult to affirm that there is actually hidden data, and even more difficult to retrieve it), some other use very simple algorithms and are easy to detect and break. You can find reliable and scientific information about steganography, digital watermarking (which is basically the same thing) and how to detect them on several web pages on the web, like the Neil Johnson site, the Fabien Petitcolas site, the Outguess page (here you can find a tool to detect steganography in images), and several others.
A few days ago, actually September 11th of 2002, first anniversary of the attack in the United States, there was a short subject talking about steganography use by terrorists. It was aired on the french private TV network "Canal Plus" on the show "Le Journal des Bonnes Nouvelles". Not only the tabloïd-like subject by itself raised my bullshit detector alarm to the red level (it's an old rumour, never proven, but the journalists transformed this rumour in facts: they said several times that terrorists actually used steganography), but also there was a lot of technical errors in the commentary. Sloppy and cheap journalism at its best, using the last hype or rumours to scare the audience.
They did a "demonstration" of a "famous" and "unbreakable, even by the NSA" steganography sofware, which hides data in a "totally indetectable way", and is "illegal". Here are some screenshots of the show:

 ................

For more:  http://www.guillermito2.net/stegano/camouflage/index.html

The original JPG picture, without anything hidden in it, is 5,139 bytes.
The original picture with the secret message added, without password, size is 6,021 bytes.
The original picture, with the secret message added, password is "aaaa", size is 6,021 bytes.
The original picture, with the secret message added, password is "a" repeated 255 times, size is 6,021 bytes. 255 bytes is the maximum size for the password, you will understand why later; if it's longer it will produce an error (we could probably use this for a classical buffer overflow exploit to force Camouflage to execute some arbitrary cod

   5. Conclusions


Don't trust what is said on TV, journalists don't know what they are talking about, and instead of doing a little bit of research asking  competent people (there are plenty in the academia and the corporate worlds), they fall for the hype, and listen to people who are incompetent or just want to have their faces on a TV screen.
Most of the steganography software around are easy to detect and to break.
If the algorithm used in some encryption or steganography software is not documented precisely, its strength is probably very weak. Never use them for serious security purposes.
Don't trust what you see on the internet, and that includes this page. Be especially aware of people with a big mouth who use big words ("unbreakable", "undetectable", etc...). Test everything yourself, or ask different people who may know more. There are plenty of forums on Usenet with specialists about almost any subject you can imagine.
[Note written much later: I've since discovered some other tools to unprotect Camouflage files:
- CKFP (Camouflage / Kamaleon File Patcher) by Vikt0ry.
- CamouflageCrack by Kasky.
- CamoDetect Perl script by Andrew Christensen, found on PacketStorm]

Have a nice day!


Source: http://www.guillermito2.net/stegano/camouflage/index.html


Take home: 
  1. Most amateur cryptography and steganography software are  breakable. The fact that you can not see the "secret message" with your naked eyes means nothing. Most media people talk non-sense when they say a software that is unbreakable.
  2. Relevance for UD case: You can not convict  an honourable soldier based on such nieve pseudo-scientific criteria. If proscution can, they should  break the code and prove that there was a "secret message" and what the "secret message was" and how that message involved   a "national secret" and how the "spy had really  betrayed the nation"!  If not, eat the dust and face consequences for "betraying the nation" by torturing and destroying an honourable soldier  who served the nation honourably for 40 years!